There are 2 arguments here, be sure to read both and decide who has the better argument.
Argument 1:
Thomas Aquinas summarizing the 5 ‘strongest’ arguments for God
The Existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that
in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing
can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves
inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to
actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.
Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby
moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in
the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot;
but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way
a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must
be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must
needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then
there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only
inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the
hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone
understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of
efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the
efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not
possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the
intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be
several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first
cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it
is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any
intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause,
to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are
possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are
possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at
some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been
nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which
does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in
existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would
be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something
the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or
not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as
has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some
being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their
necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and
some less good, true, noble and the like. But ‘more’ and ‘less’ are predicated of different things, according as
they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter
according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest,
something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things
that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is
the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection;
and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world, We see that things which lack intelligence, such as
natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as
to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
Argument 2:
Richard Dawkins criticizing Aquinas’ argument
Thomas Aquinas”Proofs’
The five ‘proofs’ asserted by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century don’t prove anything, and are
easily—though l hesitate to say so, given his eminence—exposed as vacuous. The first three are just different
ways of saying the same thing, and they can be considered together. All involve an infinite regress—the answer
to a question raises a prior question, and so on ad infinitum.
I . The Unmoved Mover Nothing moves without a prior mover. This leads us to a regress, from which the only
escape is God. Something had to make the first move, and that something we call God.
2. The Uncaused Case. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed
back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God.
3. The Cosmological Argument. There must have been a time when no physical things existed. But, since
physical things exist now, there must have been something non-physical to bring them into existence, and
that something we call God.
All three of these arguments rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the
entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. Even if we allow the dubious
luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we
need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally
ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human
attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving his sins and reading innermost thoughts. If God is omniscient, he
must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But
that means he can’t change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent…
To return to the infinite regress and the futility of invoking God to terminate it, it is more parsimonious to
conjure up, say, a ‘big bang singularity’, or some other physical concept as yet unknown. Calling it God is at
best unhelpful and at worst perniciously misleading. It is by no means clear that God provides a natural
terminator to the regresses of Aquinas. That’s putting it mildly, as we shall see later. Let’s move on down
Aquinas’ list.
4. The Argument from Degree. We notice that things in the world differ; There are degrees of, say, goodness
or perfection. But we judge these degrees only by comparison with a maximum. Humans can be both good
and bad, so the maximum goodness cannot rest in us. Therefore there must be some other maximum to
set he standard for perfection, and we call that maximum God.
That’s an argument? You might as well say, people vary in smelliness but we can make the comparison only
by reference to a perfect maximum of conceivable smelliness. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently
peerless stinker, and we call him God. Or substitute any dimension of comparison you like, and derive an
equivalently fatuous conclusion.
5. The Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design. Things in the world, especially living things, look as
though they have been designed. Nothing that we know looks designed unless it is designed. Therefore
there must have been a designer, and we call him God.
The argument from design is the only one still in regular use today, and it still sounds to many like the
ultimate knockdown argument . . . There has probably never been a more devastating rout of popular
belief by clever reasoning than Charles Darwin’s destruction of the argument from design. It was so
unexpected. Thanks to Darwin, it is no longer true to say that nothing that we know looks designed
unless it is designed. Evolution by natural selection produces an excellent simulacrum of design,
mounting prodigious heights of complexity and elegance.
Discuss who made the better argument, and why.